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Abstract—Effective defense against cyber-physical attacks
in power grid requires the capability of accurate damage
assessment within the attacked area. While some solutions have
been proposed to recover the phase angles and the link status
(i.e., breaker status) within the attacked area, existing solutions
made the limiting assumption that the grid stays connected
after the attack. To fill this gap, we study the problem of
recovering the phase angles and the link status under a general
cyber-physical attack that may partition the grid into islands.
To this end, we (i) show that the existing solutions and recovery
conditions still hold if the post-attack power injections in the
attacked area are known, and (ii) propose a linear programming-
based algorithm that can perfectly recover the link status under
certain conditions even if the post-attack power injections are
unknown. Our numerical evaluations based on the Polish power
grid demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is highly accurate
in localizing failed links once the phase angles are known.
Index Terms—Power grid state estimation, cyber-physical at-
tack, failure localization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern power grids are interdependent cyber-physical
systems consisting of a power transmission system (power
lines, substations, etc.) and an associated control system
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition - SCADA and
Wide-Area Monitoring Protection and Control - WAMPAC)
that monitors and controls the status of the power grid. This
interdependency raises a legitimate concern: what happens
if an attacker attacks both the physical grid and its control
system simultaneously? The resulting attack, known as a joint
cyber-physical attack, can cause large-scale blackouts, as the
cyber attack can blindfold the control system and thus make
the physical attack on the power grid more damaging. For
example, one such attack on Ukraine’s power grid left 225,000
people without power for days [2].
The potential severity of cyber-physical attacks has attracted
efforts in countering these attacks [3], [4]. One of the challenges
in dealing with such attacks is that as the cyber attack blocks
measurements (e.g., phase angles, breaker status, and so on)
from the attacked area, the control center is unable to accurately
identify the damage caused by the physical attack (e.g., which
lines are disconnected) and hence unable to make accurate
mitigation decisions. To address this challenge, solutions have
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been proposed to estimate the state of the power grid inside
the attacked area using power flow models. Specifically, [3]
developed methods to estimate the grid state under cyber-
physical attacks using the direct-current (DC) power flow
model, and [4] developed similar methods using the alternating-
current (AC) power flow model. Both works made the limiting
assumption that either (i) the grid remains connected after the
attack, or (ii) the control center is aware of the supply/demand
in each island formed after the attack – both leading to known
post-attack active power injection at each bus.
In practice, however, disconnecting lines within the attacked
area may cause partitioning of the grid and change the active
power injections, and such changes within the attacked area
will not be directly observable to the control center due to the
cyber attack. Our goal is thus to estimate the power grid state,
especially the breaker status of lines, under cyber-physical
attacks without the above assumption.
A. Related Work
Power grid state estimation, as a key functionality for
supervisory control, has been extensively studied in the liter-
ature [5]. Secure state estimation under attack is of particular
interest [6]. Specifically, the attackers can distort sensor data
with noise [7] or inject false data [8] so that the control center
cannot correctly estimate the phase angles [9] or the topology
[10] of the power grid. Recently, joint cyber-physical attacks
are gaining attention, as the physical effect of such attacks
are harder to detect due to the cyber attack [3], [11], [12].
In particular, several approaches have been proposed for
detecting failed links. In [13], [14], the problem is formulated
as a mixed-integer program, which becomes computationally
inefficient when multiple links fail. The problem is formulated
as a sparse recovery problem over an overcomplete
representation in [15], [16], where the combinatorial sparse
recovery problem was relaxed to a linear programming (LP)
problem. Based on this approach, the work in [3] further
establishes graph-theoretic conditions for accurately recovering
the failed links. All the algorithms in [3], [15], [16] aim to find
the sparsest solution among the feasible solutions under the
assumption that the power grid remains connected after failure.
All the state estimation solutions require the modeling of
the relationship between the observable parameters and the
unknown variables of interest. To this end, two types of models
have been considered: DC power flow model and AC power
flow model. The AC power flow model [17] is based on the
AC power flow equations, which can represent the voltage
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
02
37
7v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  4
 Se
p 2
02
0
magnitude and phase angle at each bus in the system. The DC
power flow model [18] is an approximation of the AC power
flow model by neglecting the resistive losses and assuming
a uniform voltage profile. In the literature of state estimation
and particularly failure localization, most existing solutions
are based on the DC power flow model [3], [13]–[16], with
few exceptions [4], [19]. We adopt the DC power flow model
in this work due to its simplicity and robustness, and leave
extensions to the AC power flow model to future work.
B. Summary of Contributions
We aim at estimating the power grid state within an attacked
area, focusing on the phase angles and the link status (i.e.,
breaker status of lines), with the following contributions:
1) We show that an existing rank-based condition for
recovering the phase angles, previously established when
the grid remains connected after the attack, still holds
without this limiting assumption.
2) We show that existing graph-theoretical conditions for
localizing the failed links, previously established under
the above assumption of a connected grid, still hold with-
out this assumption if the post-attack power injections
are known.
3) When the post-attack power injections are unknown but
the phase angles are known, we develop an LP-based
algorithm that is guaranteed to correctly identify the
status of failed/operational links under certain conditions.
4) Our evaluations on a large grid topology show that the
proposed algorithm is highly accurate in localizing the
failed links with few false alarms, while the rank-based
condition for recovering the phase angles can be hard
to satisfy, signaling the importance of protecting PMU
measurements.
Roadmap. Section II formulates our overall problem, which
is divided into three subproblems addressed in Sections III–V.
Then Section VI evaluates our solutions on a real grid topology,
and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Power Grid Model
We model the power grid as a connected undirected graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes (buses) and E
the set of links (transmission lines). Each link e = (s, t) is
associated with a reactance rst (rst = rts) and a status ∈
{operational, failed} (assumed to be operational before attack).
Each node v is associated with a phase angle θv and an active
power injection pv. The phase angles θ := (θv)v∈V and the
active powers p := (pv)v∈V are related by
Bθ = p, (1)
where B := (buv)u,v∈V ∈ R|V |×|V | is the admittance matrix,
defined as:
buv =

0 if u 6= v, (u, v) 6∈ E,
−1/ruv if u 6= v, (u, v) ∈ E,
−∑w∈V \{u} buw if u = v. (2)
Operational 
Link in 𝐸ഥ𝐻
Operational 
Link in 𝐸𝐻
Failed link
Node in 𝑉𝐻
Node in 𝑉ഥ𝐻
H
Figure 1. A cyber-physical attack that blocks information from the attacked
area H while disconnecting certain lines within H .
Table I
NOTATIONS
Notation Description
G = (V,E) power grid
H , H¯ attacked/unattacked area
F set of failed links
B admittance matrix
D incidence matrix
θ vector of phase angles
p vector of active power injections
Γ diag{ 1
re
}e∈E (re: reactance of link e)
∆ vector of changes in active power injections
Given an arbitrary orientation of the links, the topology of
G can also be represented by the incidence matrix D ∈
{−1, 0, 1}|V |×|E|, whose (i, j)-th entry is defined as
dij =
 1 if link ej comes out of node vi,−1 if link ej goes into node vi,
0 otherwise.
(3)
We assume that each node is deployed with a phasor
measurement unit (PMU) measuring the phase angle and remote
terminal units (RTUs) measuring the active power injection at
this node, and the status and the power flows of its incident
links. These reports are sent to the control center via a SCADA
or WAMPAC system. The PMU data is assumed to be com-
municated over a relatively secure WAMPAC network, and the
RTU measurements over a more vulnerable SCADA network.
B. Attack Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, an adversary attacks an area H of
the power grid by: (i) blocking reports from the nodes within
H (cyber attack on both SCADA and WAMPAC), and (ii)
disconnecting a set F (|F | > 0) of links within H (physical
attack). Formally, H = (VH , EH) is a subgraph induced by a
set of nodes VH , where EH is the set of links for which both
endpoints are in VH .
C. State Estimation Problem
Notation. The main notations are summarized in Table I.
Moreover, given a subgraph X of G, VX and EX denote the
subsets of nodes/links in X , and xX denotes the subvector of
a vector x containing elements corresponding to X . Similarly,
given two subgraphs X and Y of G, AX|Y denotes the
submatrix of a matrix A containing rows corresponding
to X and columns corresponding to Y . We use DH ∈
2
{−1, 0, 1}|VH |×|EH | to denote the incidence matrix of the
attacked area H . For each quantity x, we use x′ to denote its
value after the attack.
Goal. Our goal is to recover the post-attack phase angles θ′H
and localize the failed links F within the attacked area, based
on the state variables before the attack and the measurements
from the unattacked area H¯ after the attack.
In contrast to the previous works, we consider cases where
the attack may partition the grid into multiple islands, which
can cause changes in active power injections to maintain the
supply/demand balance in each island. Let ∆ = (∆v)v∈V :=
p − p′ denote the change in active power injections, where
∆v > 0 if v is a generator bus and ∆v ≤ 0 if v is a load bus.
III. RECOVERY OF PHASE ANGLES
Under the assumption that G remains connected after the
attack and thus ∆ = 0, [3] showed that the post-attack phase
angles in the attacked area θ′H can be recovered if the submatrix
BH¯|H of the admittance matrix has a full column rank. Below,
we will show that the same condition actually holds without
this limiting assumption.
Specifically, we have the following lemma that extends [3,
Lemma 1] to the general case of arbitrary ∆. Here “supp”
returns the indices of the non-zero entries in the input vector.
Lemma III.1. supp(B(θ − θ′)−∆) ⊆ VH .
Proof. For a link (s, t), define a column vector xst ∈
{−1, 0, 1}|V |, which has 1 in s-th element, −1 in t-th element,
and 0 elsewhere. The failure of links in F changes the
admittance matrix by1
B′ = B +
∑
(s,t)∈F
bstxstx
T
st, (4)
where bst is the (s, t)-th element in B. Before the attack, we
have Bθ = p. After the attack, we have B′θ′ = p′ = p−∆.
Therefore, the following holds:
Bθ −B′θ′ = ∆ (5)
⇒ B(θ − θ′)−∆ =
∑
(s,t)∈F
bstxstx
T
stθ
′ (6)
⇒ supp(B(θ − θ′)−∆) ⊆
⋃
(s,t)∈F
{s, t} ⊆ VH , (7)
where (6) is obtained by plugging in (4) into (5).
Using Lemma III.1, we will prove that the recovery condition
in [3, Theorem 1] remains sufficient even if its assumption of
a connected post-attack grid (hence ∆ = 0) may not hold.
Theorem III.1. The phase angles θ′H within the attacked area
can be recovered correctly if BH¯|H has a full column rank.
Proof. By Lemma III.1, we see that BH¯|G(θ−θ′)−∆H¯ = 0.
Writing this equation in more detail shows that
BH¯|H(θH − θ′H) +BH¯|H¯(θH¯ − θ′¯H)−∆H¯ = 0 (8)
⇒ BH¯|Hθ′H = BH¯|HθH +BH¯|H¯(θH¯ − θ′¯H)−∆H¯ . (9)
1There was a mistake in the proof of [3, Lemma 1], which claimed that
B′ = B −∑(s,t)∈F bstxstxTst.
Since both BH¯|H and the righthand side of (9) are known to
the control center, we can uniquely recover θ′H if BH¯|H has
a full column rank.
In the special case of ∆ = 0, [3] gave an explicit graph-
theoretical condition that was derived from the rank-based
condition. As the rank-based condition remains valid in the
general case by Theorem III.1, the graph-theoretical condition
also holds in general.
Corollary III.1 ([3]). If there is a matching (i.e., a set of links
without common endpoints) among the links with one endpoint
in VH and the other endpoint in VH¯ that covers VH , then θ
′
H
can be recovered almost surely.
IV. LOCALIZING FAILED LINKS WITH KNOWN ACTIVE
POWERS
Now assume that the post-attack phase angles θ′ have been
recovered. This can be achieved by solving (9) when BH¯|H
has a full column rank, or directly reported from PMUs –
assuming that the cyber attack only affects SCADA but not
the WAMPAC network carrying PMU measurements2. We
will show that as long as the change in active powers ∆ is
known, the failed links can be uniquely localized under the
same conditions as specified in [3].
First, we note that under practical assumptions, the con-
ditions presented in Section III for recovering the phase
angles greatly simplify the recovery of the active powers.
To this end, we assume that the adjustment of active power
injections at generator/load buses follows the proportional load
shedding/generation reduction policy, where (i) either the load
or the generation (but not both) will be reduced upon the
formation of an island, and (ii) if nodes u and v are in the
same island and of the same type (both load or generator),
then p′u/pu = p
′
v/pv . This policy models the common practice
in adjusting load/generation in the case of islanding [22], [23].
We observe the following cases in which the active powers
can be recovered via this policy.
Lemma IV.1. Let N(v; H¯) denote the set of all the nodes in
H¯ that are connected to node v via links in E \ EH . Then
under the proportional load shedding policy, ∆v for v ∈ VH
can be recovered unless N(v; H¯) = ∅ or every u ∈ N(v; H¯)
is of a different type from v with ∆u = 0.
Proof. As failures can only occur within EH , nodes in N(v; H¯)
must be in the same island as v after the attack. Under the
proportional load shedding policy, we know that (i) if ∃u ∈
N(v; H¯) of the same type as v, then we can recover the post-
attack active power at v by p′v = pvp
′
u/pu and thus recover
∆v; (ii) if ∃u ∈ N(v; H¯) of a different type from v (e.g., u
is a generator bus but v is a load bus) and ∆u 6= 0, then ∆v
must be zero. This proves the claim.
Remark 1: Under the condition of Theorem III.1, i.e., BH¯|H
has a full column rank, each v ∈ VH must be the neighbor of
2This can occur in hybrid control systems, as the PMU measurements are
reported via a modern WAMPAC system with stronger defenses and the other
sensor measurements are reported via a legacy SCADA system that is more
vulnerable to cyber attacks [20], [21].
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at least one node in H¯ (otherwise its corresponding column in
BH¯|H will be 0), and thus N(v; H¯) 6= ∅. Moreover, majority
of the nodes in practice are load buses, and thus each node in
H is likely to be a load bus neighboring to another load bus in
H¯ . Thus, we can usually recover ∆H under the proportional
load shedding policy if the condition for recovering θ′H holds.
Remark 2: Besides the cases indicated in Lemma IV.1, it is
also easy to show that if H contains no generator bus or no
load bus, and
∑
v∈VH¯ ∆v = 0, then we must have ∆H = 0.
Next, we will establish the conditions for localizing the
failed links F with known θ′ and ∆. The basic observation is
the following property of the set F .
Lemma IV.2. There exists a vector x ∈ R|EH | that satisfies
supp(x) = F , and
DHx = BH|G(θ − θ′)−∆H . (10)
Proof. Note that by definition, xst defined in the proof of
Lemma III.1 is the same as the column corresponding to link
(s, t) in D. Define a vector y ∈ R|E| by
ye =
{
bst(θ
′
s − θ′t) if e = (s, t) ∈ F,
0 o.w. (11)
Then it is easy to see that
∑
(s,t)∈F bstxstx
T
stθ
′ = Dy. By
(6), we have B(θ − θ′) −∆ = Dy. Considering only the
equations corresponding to VH yields
BH|G(θ − θ′)−∆H = DHyH , (12)
where we have used the fact that yH¯ = 0. Thus x = yH
satisfies the conditions in the lemma.
This lemma, which replaces [3, Lemma 2], implies that if
one can find the conditions under which the solution to (10) is
unique, then the links corresponding to non-zero elements of
this solution must be the failed links. To this end, [3] gave a
set of graph-theoretic conditions. As these conditions are only
about the solution space of DHx = y, they remain valid in our
setting as long as the righthand side is known. We summarize
these conditions below for completeness.
Theorem IV.1. The failed links F within the attacked area
can be localized correctly if:
1) H is acyclic (i.e., a tree or a set of trees), in which case
(10) has a unique solution x for which supp(x) = F , or
2) H is a planar graph satisfying (i) for any cycle C in
H , |C ∩ F | < |C \ F |, and (ii) F ∗ is H∗-separable3,
in which case the optimization min ‖x‖1 s.t. (10) has a
unique solution x for which supp(x) = F .
Proof. Condition (1) is implied by [3, Lemma 3], which proved
that DH has a full column rank if and only if H is acyclic.
This combined with Lemma IV.2 shows that if H is acyclic,
then (10) only has one solution, and hence the support of this
solution must be F .
Condition (2) is implied by the proof of [3, Theorem 2],
which showed that if H satisfies this condition, then any solu-
3Here H∗ is the dual graph of H , and F ∗ is the set of edges in H∗ such
that each edge in F ∗ connects a pair of vertices that correspond to adjacent
faces in H separated by a failed link.
tion x to (10) must satisfy ‖x‖1 ≥ ‖x∗‖1, where x∗ is a vector
satisfying the conditions in Lemma IV.2. Moreover, it showed
that ‖x‖1 = ‖x∗‖1 only if x = x∗. Thus, x∗, whose support
equals F , can be computed by minimizing ‖x‖1 s.t. (10).
Special cases satisfying the second condition in Theorem IV.1
include that (i) H is a cycle in which majority of the links
have not failed, and (ii) H is a planar bipartite graph in which
each cycle contains fewer failed links than non-failed links [3].
V. LOCALIZING FAILED LINKS WITH UNKNOWN ACTIVE
POWERS
Although providing strong theoretical guarantees, the solu-
tions for localizing failed links given in Section IV are only
applicable to small attacked areas with simple topologies (e.g.,
trees or cycles in which every node is connected to another
node outside the attacked area). To deal with larger attacked
areas for which ∆H cannot be recovered by Lemma IV.1, we
investigate alternative solutions by jointly estimating the set
of failed links F and the changes in active power injections
∆H . As in Section IV, we assume that the post-attack phase
angles θ′ are known, which can be either inferred or directly
measured.
A. Solution
Our approach is to formulate the joint estimation problem
as an optimization as follows.
Constraints: Let x ∈ {0, 1}|E| be an indicator vector such
that xe = 1 if and only if e ∈ F . Due to B = DΓDT (see
Table I for the definitions), we can write the post-attack ad-
mittance matrix as B′ = B −DΓdiag{x}DT , which implies
∆H = BH|G(θ − θ′) +DHΓHdiag{DTG|Hθ′}xH , (13)
where DG|H ∈ {−1, 0, 1}|V |×|EH | is the submatrix of the
incidence matrix D only containing the columns corresponding
to links in H . For simplicity, we define
D˜ := DΓdiag{DTθ′}. (14)
For link ek = (i, j), (D˜)i,k = −(D˜)j,k = θ
′
i−θ′j
rij
, where
| θ
′
i−θ′j
rij
| indicates the post-attack power flow on link ek if it
is operational.
Besides (13), ∆H is also constrained as
pv ≥ ∆v ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ {u |u ∈ VH , pu > 0} , (15a)
pv ≤ ∆v ≤ 0, ∀v ∈ {u |u ∈ VH , pu ≤ 0} , (15b)
1T∆ = 0, (15c)
which ensures that a generator/load bus will remain of the
same type after the attack, and the total power is balanced. It is
worth noting that (15c) is ensured by (13), which implies that
1T∆H−1TBH|G(θ−θ′) = (1T D˜H)xH = 0 since 1T D˜H =
0 by definition (14). This implies that any ∆H satisfying (13)
will satisfy 1T∆H = 1TBH|G(θ − θ′) = 1T∆∗H (∆∗H : the
ground-truth load shedding values in H), and thus satisfy (15c).
Hence, we will omit (15c) in the sequel.
Objective: The problem of failure localization aims at finding
a set Fˆ that is as close as possible to the set F of failed links,
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while satisfying all the constraints. The solution is generally not
unique, e.g., if both endpoints of a link l ∈ EH are disconnected
from H¯ after the attack, then the status of l will have no impact
on any observable variable, and hence cannot be determined.
To resolve this ambiguity, we set our objective as using the
fewest failed links to satisfy all the constraints. This idea has
been applied to failure localization in power grid in various
forms [3], [16]. Mathematically, the problem is formulated as
(P0) min
xH ,∆H
1TxH (16a)
s.t. (13), (16b)
(15a)− (15b), (16c)
xe ∈ {0, 1}, ∀e ∈ EH , (16d)
where the decision variables are xH and ∆H . Next, we
characterize the complexity of (P0).
Lemma V.1. The optimization (P0) is NP-hard.
Proof. We will prove the claim by a reduction from the subset
sum problem, which is known to be NP-hard [24]. Given any
set of non-negative integers {fi ≥ 0}ni=1 and a target value
T , the subset sum problem determines whether there exists
{xi ∈ {0, 1}}ni=1 such that
∑n
i=1 fixi = T . For each subset
sum instance, we construct the following star-shaped attacked
area H: let H = (VH , EH) such that VH is composed of n+1
nodes, where node u0 is the hub with pu0 = 0 and θ
′
u0 = 0,
and node ui (i ∈ [n] for [n] := {1, . . . , n}) is incident to
only one link ei = (u0, ui), with pui = −fi, θ′ui = −fi,
and rei = 1. In addition, u0 is connected to v ∈ VH¯ , with
θ′v =
∑n
i=1 fi − T , through link e0 = (u0, v) with re0 = 1.
By substituting (13) and pu0 = 0, (15b) for node u0
becomes D˜H,u0xH = Bu0|Gθ
′, where D˜H,u0 is the row of
D˜H corresponding to node u0. Since (D˜H,u0)i =
θ′u0−θ
′
ui
rei
,
it is easy to check that D˜H,u0xH =
∑n
i=1 fixi. Moreover,
Bu0|Gθ
′ =
∑n
i=1 fi +
θ′u0−θ
′
v
re0
= T . Since ui (i ∈ [n])
is connected to only one link ei = (u0, ui), we have that
D˜H,uixH = −fixi and Bui|Gθ′ = −fi. Thus, (15b) for ui
becomes −fi ≤ −fixi ≤ 0, which is satisfied whatever value
xi takes. Therefore, a subset sum instance returns true if and
only if the instance of (P0) constructed as above is feasible,
which completes the proof.
By relaxing the integer constraint (16d), (P0) is relaxed into
(P1) min
xH ,∆H
1TxH (17a)
s.t. (13), (17b)
(15a)− (15b), (17c)
0 ≤ xH ≤ 1. (17d)
where 0 ≤ xH ≤ 1 denotes element-wise inequality. The
problem (P1) is a linear program (LP) which can be solved
in polynomial time. Based on (P1), we propose an algorithm
for localizing the failed links, given in Algorithm 1, where
the input parameter η ∈ (0, 1) is a threshold for rounding the
factional solution of xH to an integral solution (η = 0.5 in
our experiments). We will analyze how η affects the trade-off
between miss rate and false alarm rate of Algorithm 1 at the
discussion after Theorem V.2 at Section V-B.
Algorithm 1: Failed Link Detection
Input: B,p,∆H¯ ,θ,θ′,D, η
Output: Fˆ
1 Solve the problem (P1) to obtain xH ;
2 Return Fˆ = {e : xe ≥ η}.
B. Analysis
We now analyze when the proposed algorithm can correctly
localize the failed links. In the sequel, ∆∗H denotes the ground-
truth load shedding values in H and x∗H denotes the ground-
truth failure indicators (i.e., x∗e = 1 if e ∈ F and x∗e = 0 if
e ∈ EH \ F ).
According to (15), we decompose VH into VH,L for nodes
with pv ≤ 0 and VH,G for the rest. Define E1 ⊆ EH as the
set of links that operate normally after failure, and F ⊆ EH
as the failed links. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. As in [3], we assume that for each link (s, t) ∈
EH , θ′s 6= θ′t, as otherwise the link will carry no power flow
and hence its status cannot be identified4.
1) Main Results: First, we simplify (P1) into an equivalent
but simpler optimization problem. To this end, we combine
the decision variables ∆H and xH of (P1) into a single
vector yH = [∆TH ,x
T
H ]
T ∈ R(|EH |+|VH |) (where [A,B]
denotes horizontal concatenation), and explicitly represent
the solution to yH that satisfies (13). Notice that (13) can
be written as [I|VH |,−D˜H ]yH = BH|G(θ − θ′) (I|VH |:
the |VH | × |VH | identity matrix). The ground-truth solution
y∗H = [(∆
∗
H)
T , (x∗H)
T ]T certainly satisfies (13). Next,
consider the null space of [I|VH |,−D˜H ], whose dimension is
|EH |. It is easy to verify that [d˜Te ,uTe ]T (e ∈ EH ) are |EH |
independent vectors spanning the null space of [I|VH |,−D˜H ],
where d˜e is the column vector of D˜H corresponding to link e,
and ue is a unit vector in R|EH | with the e-th element being 1
and the other elements being 0. Therefore, any yH satisfying
(13) can be expressed as
yH =
[
∆∗H
x∗H
]
+
∑
e∈EH
ce
[
d˜e
ue
]
. (18)
Based on the decomposition of VH into VH,L and VH,G, D˜H
and ∆H can be written as
D˜H =
E1 F[ ]
VH,L D˜H,L,1 D˜H,L,F
VH,G D˜H,G,1 D˜H,G,F
, (19a)
∆H =
[ ]
VH,L ∆H,L
VH,G ∆H,G . (19b)
4This assumption essentially means that we will ignore the existence of
such links in failure localization.
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Let D˜H,L := [D˜H,L,1, D˜H,L,F ], D˜H,G := [D˜H,G,1, D˜H,G,F ],
and c := (ce)e∈EH ∈ R|EH |. Since ∆H,L and ∆H,G are
constrained differently in (15a) and (15b), we introduce ΛL =
[I|VH,L|,0] and ΛG = [0, I|VH,G|] such that ∆H,L = ΛL∆H ,
∆H,G = ΛG∆H , D˜H,L = ΛLD˜H and D˜H,G = ΛGD˜H .
According to (18), for Algorithm 1 to correctly localize the
failed links, it suffices to have x∗e + ce ≥ η for all e ∈ F and
x∗e+ce < η for all e /∈ F . Equivalently, it suffices to ensure that
the optimal solution c∗ to the following optimization problem
satisfies c∗e ≥ η − 1 for all e ∈ F and c∗e < η for all e /∈ F :
min
c
1T c (20a)
s.t. D˜H,Lc ≤ −∆∗H,L, (20b)
− D˜H,Lc ≤ −(ΛLpH −∆∗H,L), (20c)
− D˜H,Gc ≤∆∗H,G, (20d)
D˜H,Gc ≤ ΛGpH −∆∗H,G, (20e)
− c ≤ x∗H , (20f)
c ≤ 1− x∗H , (20g)
This equivalent formulation of (P1) will help to simplify
our analysis by eliminating the equality constraint (13). For
notational simplicity, we will omit the subscript H in the
sequel unless it causes confusion.
Next, we use (20) to analyze the accuracy of Algorithm 1.
Let Fˆ be the failed link set returned by Algorithm 1. We first
define Qm = F \ Fˆ as the set of failed links that are not
detected, and Qf = Fˆ \ F as the set of operational links that
are falsely detected as failed. Note that according to (20), a
failed link e ∈ F is missed if and only if c∗e < η−1. Similarly,
an operational link e /∈ F is falsely detected as failed if and
only if c∗e ≥ η. To express this in a vector form, we define
Wm ∈ {0, 1}|Qm|×|EH | as a binary matrix, where for each
i = 1, . . . , |Qm|, (Wm)i,j = 1 if the i-th missed link is link
ej and thus we have Wmc∗ ≤ (η − 1)1. Similarly, Wf ∈
{0, 1}|Qf |×|EH | is defined such that (Wf )i,k = 1 if the i-th
false-alarmed link is link ek, which leads to −Wfc∗ ≤ −η1.
For ease of presentation, we define
ATD := [D˜
T
L ,−D˜TL ,−D˜TG, D˜TG] ∈ R|EH |×2|VH |, (21a)
ATx := [−I|EH |, I|EH |] ∈ R|EH |×2|EH |, (21b)
W T := [W Tm,−W Tf ] ∈ R|EH |×(|Qm|+|Qf |), (21c)
gTD := [−(∆∗L)T , (−p′L)T , (∆∗G)T , (p′G)T ], (21d)
gTx := [(x
∗)T ,1T − (x∗)T ] ∈ R1×2|EH |, (21e)
gTw := [(η − 1)1T ,−η1T ] ∈ R1×(|Qm|+|Qf |). (21f)
Then the constraints for (20) can be succinctly written as
[ATD,A
T
x ]
T c ≤ [gTD, gTx ]T , and the optimal solution must
satisfy Wc ≤ gw. Next, we will give a simple but important
observation, which lays the groundwork for further analysis.
Lemma V.2. A link e ∈ F cannot be missed (e /∈ F \ Fˆ ) by
Algorithm 1 if for any Qm containing e, there is always a
solution z ≥ 0 to
[ATD,A
T
x ,W
T ,1]z = 0, (22a)
[gTD, g
T
x , g
T
w ,0]z < 0. (22b)
Similarly, a link e ∈ EH \ F cannot be falsely detected as
failed by Algorithm 1 if for any Qf with e ∈ Qf , there always
exists a solution z ≥ 0 to (22).
Proof. First note that c = 0 is feasible to (20). If Fˆ is returned
by Algorithm 1 with e ∈ F \ Fˆ , there must exist an optimal
solution c∗ to (20) such that c∗e ≤ η − 1. Thus, c∗ must be
feasible to (20) with 1T c∗ ≤ 0, which can be formulated as
[ATD,A
T
x ,W
T ,1]T c∗ ≤ [gTD, gTx , gTw , 0]T , (23)
where W and gw are defined for some Qm and Qf such that
e ∈ Qm. According to Gale’s theorem of alternative [25], there
is solution to (23) if and only if there is no solution z ≥ 0 to
(22). That is to say, e /∈ F \ Fˆ if there is always a non-negative
solution to (22) for any Qm containing e. The condition for
of e /∈ Fˆ \ F can be proved similarly.
For ease of presentation, we will introduce a few notations
as follows. Denote D˜u as the row in D˜ corresponding to node
u, and D˜u,e as the entry in D˜u corresponding to link e. Recall
that as defined in (14), if e = (u, v), then
D˜u,e =
θ′u − θ′v
ruv
. (24)
Define zD ∈ R2|VH | as the subvector of z corresponding to
AD. More specifically, since both D˜ and −D˜ are included
in AD, denote zD,u as the entry in zD corresponding to D˜u
in AD and zD,−u as the entry for −D˜u in AD. Define gD,u
and gD,−u as the entries in gD corresponding to zD,u and
zD,−u, respectively. That is, if pu ≤ 0, then gD,u := −∆∗u and
gD,−u := −p′u; if pu > 0, then gD,u := p′u and gD,−u := ∆∗u.
For ATx , W
T and 1 in (22a), zx ∈ R2|EH |, zw ∈ R|Qm|+|Qf |
and z∗ ∈ R are their counterparts in z. Specifically, if link
e ∈ F is the ith link in Qm, we have (Wm)i,e = 1 and zw,m,e
is used to denote the entry in zw that corresponds to the ith
column of W Tm; zw,f,e is defined similarly if e ∈ Qf . For each
link e, we denote zx−,e as the entry in zx corresponding to x∗e
in gx and zx+,e as the entry corresponding to (1− x∗e) in gx.
Although Lemma V.2 can already be utilized as recovery
conditions, it does not explicitly characterize what type of links
are guaranteed to be correctly identified. To this end, we will
show that a link will satisfy the conditions in Lemma V.2 (and
can thus be correctly identified by Algorithm 1) if its endpoints
satisfy certain conditions. To make our conditions as general
as possible, we introduce a generalization of node called hyper-
node as follows (a single node is also a hyper-node):
Definition V.1. A set of nodes U ⊆ VH is a hyper-node if they
induce a connected subgraph before attack.
We define a few properties of a hyper-node U . Define EU
as the set of links with exactly one endpoint in U , i.e, EU :=
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Figure 2. An example of hyper-node (arrow denotes the direction of a power
flow or a hypothetical power flow).
{e|e = (s, t) ∈ EH , s ∈ U, t /∈ U}. If EU ∩F 6= ∅, we define
D˜U,e :=
∑
u∈U
D˜u,e, (25a)
SU := {e ∈ EU \ F | ∃l ∈ EU ∩ F, D˜U,lD˜U,e > 0}, (25b)
fU,0 := max
e∈SU
|D˜U,e|, where fU,0 := 0 if SU = ∅, (25c)
fU,1 := min
e∈EU∩F
|D˜U,e|, (25d)
fU,g :=
{∑
u∈U gD,u if ∃l ∈ EU ∩ F, D˜U,l < 0,∑
u∈U gD,−u otherwise.
(25e)
Example 1. Consider an attacked area H as shown in Fig. 2,
where blue circles denote nodes (buses) while the direction
of each link indicates the direction of power flow5. Suppose
that F = {l2, l6} and all nodes are load buses. Nodes u1, u2
and u3 form a hyper-node U , where EU = {l2, l4, l6, l7},
SU = {l7}, fU,0 = |D˜U,l7 |, fU,1 = min{|D˜U,l2 |, |D˜U,l6 |} and
fU,g = −
∑
v∈U ∆
∗
v. D˜U,l1 = D˜u1,l1 + D˜u2,l1 = 0 since
l1 /∈ EU , while D˜U,l2 = D˜u2,l2 6= 0 since l2 ∈ EU .
Based on these definitions and Lemma V.2, we are ready to
present a condition under which a failed link l ∈ F will not
be missed by Algorithm 1.
Theorem V.1. A failed link l ∈ F will be detected by Algo-
rithm 1, i.e., l ∈ Fˆ , if there exists at least one hyper-node (say
U ) such that l ∈ EU , for which the following conditions hold:
1) ∀e, l ∈ EU ∩ F , D˜U,eD˜U,l > 0,
2) SU = ∅, and
3) fU,g + (η − 1)|D˜U,l| < 0.
Proof. We will prove by showing that there is always a solution
to (22) for any possible Qf and Qm if l ∈ EU ∩ Qm. We
prove this by directly constructing a solution z for (22) as
follows: ∀u ∈ U , if D˜U,l < 0, set zD,u = 1; otherwise,
set zD,−u = 1. Set zw,m,l = |D˜U,l|, zx−,e′ = |D˜U,e′ | for
e′ ∈ EU \ F , zx+,e = |D˜U,e| for e ∈ EU ∩ F \ {l}, and
other entries of z to 0. Note that (x∗)e′ = 0,∀e′ ∈ EU \ F ,
and (1− x∗)e = 0,∀e ∈ EU ∩ F . Then, we will demonstrate
why (22) is satisfied under this assignment of z. First, the
row of the left-hand-side of (22a) corresponding to link l is
expanded as −|D˜U,l|+zw,m,e = 0, and each row corresponding
to e ∈ F \ {l} is be expanded as −|∑u∈U D˜u,e| + zx+,e =
−|D˜U,e|+zx+,e = 0 due to condition 1). Second, since SU = ∅,
for all e′ ∈ EU \F , the corresponding row in (22a) is expanded
into |D˜U,e′ | − zx−,e′ = 0. Other rows of (22a) holds trivially
5These may be hypothetical power flows computed by (24), as a failed link
will not carry any flow.
since they only involve the zero-entries in the constructed z.
Thus, (22a) holds under this assignment. As for (22b), its left-
hand-side can be expanded as fU,g + (η− 1)|D˜U,l| < 0 due to
condition 3). According to Lemma V.2, l ∈ EU ∩ F will not
be missed, which completes the proof.
Based on similar arguments, the following condition can
guarantee that an operational link l ∈ EH \F will not be falsely
detected by Algorithm 1 (l /∈ Fˆ ). For notational simplicity,
we first extend the definition of fU,g to a hyper-node U with
EU ∩ F = ∅:
fU,g :=
{ ∑
u∈U gD,u if ∃l ∈ EU \ F, D˜U,l > 0,∑
u∈U gD,−u otherwise.
(26)
Theorem V.2. An operational link l ∈ EH \ F will not be
detected (as failed) by Algorithm 1, i.e., l /∈ Fˆ , if there exists
at least one hyper-node (say U ) such that l ∈ EU , for which
the following conditions hold:
1) ∀l, l′ ∈ EU \ F, D˜U,lD˜U,l′ > 0,
2) SU = ∅ if EU ∩ F 6= ∅, and
3) fU,g − η|D˜U,l| < 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem V.1, we will prove by
showing that there is always a solution to (22) for any possible
Qf and Qm if l ∈ EU ∩ Qf . We construct the following z:
∀u ∈ U , if D˜U,l < 0, set zD,u = 1; otherwise, set zD,−u = 1.
Set zw,f,l = |D˜U,l|, zx−,e′ = |D˜U,e′ | for e′ ∈ EU \ (F ∪ {l}),
zx+,e = |D˜U,e| for e ∈ EU ∩ F , and other entries of z to 0.
Then, it is easy to check that (22a) is satisfied. As for (22b), con-
sidering that gTx zx =
∑
e′∈EU\F x
∗
e′ +
∑
e∈EU∩F (1−x∗e) = 0
since (x∗)e′ = 0, ∀e′ ∈ EU\F and (1−x∗)e = 0, ∀e ∈ EU∩F ,
the left-hand-side of (22b) can be expanded as
gTDzD + g
T
x zx − ηzw,f,l = fU,g − η|D˜u,l| < 0, (27)
where fU,g =
∑
u∈U gD,u if D˜U,l > 0 and fU,g =∑
u∈U gD,−u if D˜U,l < 0, and the last inequality holds due
to condition 3). Thus, according to Lemma V.2, l /∈ Fˆ , which
completes the proof.
Remark: Theorems V.1 and V.2 provide sufficient conditions
for Algorithm 1 to correctly identify the status of a link l
based on the direction and magnitude of power flows around
a hyper-node U at the “endpoint” of l (i.e., l ∈ EU ):
1) The (hypothetical) power flows on all the links of the
same status (failed or operational) around U should
be in the same direction, i.e., all going into or out
of U (condition 1); all links of the different status
(if any) around U should have opposite (hypothetical)
power flow directions (condition 2); the magnitude of
the (hypothetical) power flow on the link of interest (i.e.,
l) should be sufficiently large (condition 3).
2) The value of η can be tuned to control the trade-off
between miss rate and false alarm rate. Specifically, the
condition 3) of Theorem V.1 will be easier to satisfy
with a smaller η. On the contrary, the condition 3) of
Theorem V.2 will be easier to satisfy with a larger η.
However, the conditions in Theorems V.1 and V.2 are
stronger than necessary. In particular, z∗ is always 0 in the
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proof of these theorems, which means that the optimality
condition 1T c∗ ≤ 0 formulated in (23) has not been exploited.
This results in the requirement of the condition “SU = ∅”
in these theorems. To better characterize the accuracy of
Algorithm 1, we will establish a condition that exploits the
optimality condition. To this end, we introduce a few further
definitions as follows.
Definition V.2. A hyper-node U is a fail-cover hyper-node if
EU ∩ F 6= ∅ and ∀e, l ∈ EU ∩ F , D˜U,eD˜U,l > 0.
Given a set of fail-cover hyper-nodes T , we divide T into
Tn = {Uni} and Tp = {Upi}, such that each Uni ∈ Tn
satisfies D˜Uni ,e ≤ 0 for all e ∈ F , and each Upi ∈ Tp satisfies
D˜Upi ,e ≥ 0 for all e ∈ F . Then, we define:
RUi :=
maxU∈T {fU,1}
fUi,1
, ∀Ui ∈ T, (28a)
D˜T,e :=
∑
Ui∈Tn
RUiD˜Ui,e +
∑
Ui∈Tp
(−RUi)D˜Ui,e, (28b)
ST := {e′ /∈ F |∃e ∈ F s.t. D˜T,e′D˜T,e > 0}, (28c)
fT,0 := max
e′∈ST
|D˜T,e′ |, (28d)
fT,1 := min
e∈F
|D˜T,e|, (28e)
fT,g :=
∑
Ui∈T
RUifUi,g. (28f)
Now we provide the conditions for Algorithm 1 to work
correctly when condition 2) in Theorems V.1 and V.2 is relaxed.
Theorem V.3. Assume that there exists a set of fail-cover
hyper-nodes T = {Ui} satisfying the following conditions:
1) ∀e ∈ F, |D˜T,e| ≥ fT,0, i.e., fT,1 ≥ fT,0, and
2) F ⊆ ⋃Ui∈T EUi .
Then, a failed link e ∈ F will be detected by Algorithm 1
(e ∈ Fˆ ) if
fT,g + (η − 1)(|D˜T,e| − fT,0) < 0. (29)
In addition, an operational link e′ ∈ EH \ F will not be
detected (as failed) by Algorithm 1 (e′ /∈ Fˆ ) if fT,g − η
(
fT,1 +
∣∣∣D˜T,e′ ∣∣∣) < 0 if e′ /∈ ST
fT,g − η
(
fT,1 −
∣∣∣D˜T,e′ ∣∣∣) < 0 if e′ ∈ ST (30)
Proof. We first prove the condition for a failed link e ∈ F .
Based on Lemma V.2, we prove by constructing solution to
(22) w.r.t any possible Qf and Qm if e ∈ F is the ith link
in Qm and (Wm)i,e = 1. We prove by directly constructing
the following z for (22): (i) z∗ = fT,0; (ii) ∀v ∈ VH , set
zD,v =
∑
Ui∈Tn IUi(v)RUi , zD,−v =
∑
Ui∈Tp IUi(v)RUi ,
where IUi(v) is the indicator function whose value is 1 if v ∈ Ui
and 0 otherwise; (iii) ∀l ∈ EH \ F , set zx−,l = D˜T,l + z∗;
(iv) ∀l ∈ F and l 6= e, set zx+,l = |D˜T,l| − z∗; (v)
zw,m,e = |D˜T,e| − z∗; (vi) the rest entries of z are set
as 0. Note that ∀l ∈ EH \ F , zx−,l ≥ 0 due to the
definition of fT,0. Furthermore, ∀l ∈ F \ {e}, zx+,l ≥ 0
since |D˜T,l| ≥ fT,0 by the assumption on T , and zw,m,e ≥ 0
for a similar reason. We will show that (22) is satisfied under
this assignment. First, note that according to the definition in
(28b), D˜T,l ≤ 0 for all l ∈ F , which implies that D˜T,l < 0
for all l ∈ ST and D˜T,l ≥ 0,∀l ∈ (EH \ F ) \ ST . Thus,
∀l ∈ F \ {e}, the left-hand-side of (22a) can be expanded
as
∑
Ui∈Tn RUiD˜Ui,l +
∑
Ui∈Tp RUi(−D˜Ui,l) + zx+,l + z∗ =
D˜T,l + |D˜T,l| − z∗ + z∗ = 0. Similarly, the row of the left-
hand-side of (22a) corresponding to e can be expanded as
D˜T,e + zw,m,e + z∗ = 0, while the rows corresponding to
l ∈ EH \ F can be expanded as D˜T,l − zx−,l + z∗ = 0.
Moreover, the left-hand-side of (22b) can be expanded as
fT,g + (η − 1)(|D˜T,e| − fT,0), which satisfies (22b) due to
(29). Note that this assignment of z is valid for any possible
Qm and Qf with e ∈ Qm. That is to say, there is always a
non-negative solution to (22) if e ∈ Qm, which implies that e
will not be missed by Algorithm 1 according to Lemma V.2.
Next, we prove the condition for an operational link
e′ ∈ EH \ F . Again, we prove by constructing a solution
to (22) w.r.t any possible Qf and Qm with if e′ ∈ Qf . To
this end, we construct the following assignment for z: (i)
z∗ = fT,1; (ii) ∀v ∈ VH , set zD,v =
∑
Ui∈Tn IUi(v)RUi ,
zD,−v =
∑
Ui∈Tp IUi(v)RUi ; (iii) ∀l ∈ EH \F and l 6= e′, set
zx−,l = D˜T,l + z∗; (iv) ∀l ∈ F , set zx+,l = |D˜T,l| − z∗; (v)
zw,f,e′ = D˜T,e′ + z∗; (vi) the rest entries of z are set as 0. We
will show that z ≥ 0. For l ∈ F , zx+,l ≥ 0 due to the definition
of fT,1. Thus, ∀l ∈ EH \ (F ∪{e′}), if l /∈ ST , then zx−,l ≥ 0
since D˜T,l ≥ 0; if l ∈ ST , then zx−,l ≥ fT,1 − fT,0 ≥ 0.
Similarly, zw,f,e′ ≥ 0. Furthermore, the left-hand-side of (22b)
can be expanded as [gTD, g
T
x , g
T
w ,0]z = fT,g − ηzw,f,e′ , where
zw,f,e′ = z∗ − |D˜T,e′ | if e′ ∈ ST and zw,f,e′ = z∗ + |D˜T,e′ |
if e′ /∈ ST . Then, it is easy to check that (22) is satisfied
under this assignment, which completes the proof according
to Lemma V.2.
For ease of understanding, we visualize the relationship
among the results in this section in Fig. 3. Specifically,
• Algorithm 1 can return a Fˆ 6= F , whose corresponding c∗
satisfies (23). This is because (P1) can have multiple
optimal solutions while a typical linear programming
solver can only return one of them, which can result
in Fˆ 6= F . Thus, Lemma V.2 can only cover part of all
the cases.
• The cases satisfying Lemma V.2 can be classified into
four categories according to whether they satisfy Theo-
rem V.1/V.2 or Theorem V.3.
• At a first glance, (29) in Theorem V.3 seems to include
all the cases covered by Theorem V.1 due to the relaxed
condition on SU . However, (29) depends on the value of
fT,g , which is the weighted sum of all fUi,g for Ui ∈ T .
For a failed link e, it is possible to find a hyper-node U
with fU,g = 0 such that Theorem V.1 holds, while (29)
is violated. This argument applies similarly to a link e′ ∈
EH\F . Thus, cases covered by Theorem V.1/V.2 and those
covered by Theorem V.3 partially overlap. A quantitative
analysis will be shown in Fig. 7 through experiments.
Example 2. Consider Fig. 2 as an example, where all the
nodes in H are load buses. If ∆∗u = 0,∀u ∈ V2 :=
{u1, u2, u3, u6, u7}, then T = {V2} satisfies that fT,g =
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Figure 3. Relationship between cases covered by various theorems.∑
u∈V2 gD,u = −
∑
u∈V2 ∆
∗
u = 0 and ST = ∅, which leads to
the satisfaction of (29) for all the failed links and (30) for all
the operational links. Meanwhile, l2 and l6 are guaranteed to
be correctly identified through Theorem V.1 by setting U = V2,
since SU = ∅ and fU,g = 0. Furthermore, both l3 and l5
satisfy Theorem V.2 if U = {u3, u6, u7}. As can be seen, some
failed links (l2 and l6) can be covered by both Theorem V.3
and Theorem V.1. Also, some operational links (l3 and l5) can
be covered by both Theorem V.3 and Theorem V.2. However,
l1 can only be covered by Theorem V.3.
2) Special Cases: We now use these theorems to analyze the
accuracy of Algorithm 1 in special cases of practical interest.
No islanding: Equipped with Theorems V.1 and V.2, we can
examine the accuracy of Algorithm 1 in the special case that
the grid stays connected after failure, which has been studied
in [3]. It is worthwhile to examine whether Algorithm 1 can
correctly identify F in this case (where ∆∗ = 0) because
Algorithm 1 assumes no prior knowledge of ∆∗.
Corollary V.1. If the grid stays connected after failure, H is
acyclic, and H contains either no load bus or no generator
bus, then Algorithm 1 can correctly detect F , i.e., Fˆ = F .
Proof. We only prove the case that H contains no generator
bus since the other case can be proved similarly. We first prove
that any failed link l ∈ F will not be missed (l ∈ Fˆ ). Under
Assumption 1, link l must have one endpoint (say u) such
that D˜u,l < 0. Next, we will build a hyper-node U such that
the induced subgraph is a tree rooted at node u. Specifically,
such hyper-node can be constructed by breadth-first search
(BFS) starting from node u. In the first iteration of BFS, we
start with U = {u} and add a neighbor vi of u into U if
e = (u, vi) ∈ F with D˜u,lD˜u,e < 0 or e = (u, vi) ∈ EU \ F
with D˜u,lD˜u,e > 0. Then, we repeatedly add node v into
U if ∃e = (s, v) ∈ EU ∩ F such that D˜U,lD˜U,e < 0 or
∃e = (s, v) ∈ EU \F such that D˜U,lD˜U,e > 0. This procedure
will terminate since H is acyclic, and the constructed U will
satisfy condition 1) and condition 2) of Theorem V.1. Since
all nodes u ∈ U are load buses, D˜U,l < 0, and the grid stays
connected after failure, we have fU,g = −
∑
u∈U ∆u = 0,
which satisfies condition 3) of Theorem V.1. Thus, we have
F ⊆ Fˆ .
Next, we show that any operational link e ∈ EH \ F
will not be falsely detected by Algorithm 1 (e /∈ Fˆ ). Under
Assumption 1, link e must have have one endpoint (say u) such
that D˜u,e > 0. The hyper-node U can be constructed as follows:
start with U = {u}, add node v into U if ∃e′ = (s, v) ∈ EU∩F
or ∃e′ = (s, v) ∈ EU \ F such that D˜U,eD˜U,e′ < 0. The
resulting hyper-node must satisfy condition 1) and condition 2)
of Theorem V.2. Again, we have fU,g = −
∑
u∈U ∆u = 0,
which leads to satisfaction of condition 3) in Theorem V.2.
Therefore, we have Fˆ ⊆ F .
Remark: If the grid stays connected after failure, H contains
either no load bus or no generator bus, and H contains cycles,
then the status of a link l ∈ EH is guaranteed to be correctly
identified if l is not in any cycle. This is because in this case,
we can construct a hyper-node satisfying the conditions in
Theorem V.1 or V.2 as in the proof of Corollary V.1.
Islanding: Now, we study the case where the attacked area
is decomposed into multiple islands. Formally, suppose that
the failures partition H into K islands Hi = (Vi, Ei) (i =
1, . . . ,K), where VH =
⋃K
i=1 Vi, Vi ∩ Vj = ∅ (i 6= j), and
EH = (
⋃K
i=1Ei)
⋃
Ec, with Ec being the set of links between
different islands. Then the following is implied by Theorem V.3.
Corollary V.2. Suppose that F = Ec. Let Ec,i ⊆ Ec be the
subset of failed links with one endpoint in Hi. Then, Algorithm 1
will correctly detect the failures (Fˆ = F ) if there exists a set
L ⊆ {Hi}Ki=1 with
⋃
Hi∈LEc,i = Ec, such that each Hi ∈ L
satisfies the following conditions6:
1) ∀e, e′ ∈ Ec,i, D˜Vi,eD˜Vi,e′ > 0,
2) ∀v ∈ Vi that is incident to a link in l ∈ Ec,i, f{v},0 <
f{v},1, and
3) ∀v ∈ Vi that is incident to a link in l ∈ Ec,i, gD,v = 0
if D˜v,l < 0, and gD,−v = 0 if D˜v,l > 0.
Proof. First, we construct a set of fail-cover hyper-nodes T
as required in Theorem V.3. Let VL,c contain all the nodes in⋃
Hi∈L Vi that are incident to at least one link in Ec. Formally,
VL,c := {vj}K1j=1, where ∀vj ∈ VL,c, ∃l ∈ Ec such that D˜vj ,l 6=
0. We construct T := {Uj}K1j=1, where Uj = {vj}, as the
set of fail-cover hyper-nodes, which automatically satisfies
condition 2) in Theorem V.3.
Next, we will show that the constructed T satisfies con-
dition 1) in Theorem V.3 with strict inequality. To this end,
consider any e = (u1, u2) ∈ ST . Suppose that u1, u2 ∈ Vi.
Recall from the proof of Theorem V.3 that D˜T,e < 0, and
hence at least one of U1 := {u1} and U2 := {u2} must be
in T (as otherwise D˜T,e = 0). If only U1 ∈ T (U2 6∈ T ),
then by (28b), D˜T,e = RU1D˜U1,e if D˜Vi,l < 0, ∀l ∈ Ec,i,
and D˜T,e = −RU1D˜U1,e if D˜Vi,l > 0, ∀l ∈ Ec,i. To satisfy
D˜T,e < 0, we must have D˜U1,eD˜Vi,l > 0 (∀l ∈ Ec,i), and thus
e ∈ SU1 . Therefore,
|D˜T,e| = RU1 |D˜U1,e| ≤ RU1fU1,0 < RU1fU1,1, (31)
where |D˜U1,e| ≤ fU1,0 is because of the definition of fU1,0
and that e ∈ SU1 , and fU1,0 < fU1,1 by condition 2) in
this corollary. If U1, U2 ∈ T , then e must be in one and
only one of SU1 and SU2 , as D˜U1,l1D˜U2,l2 > 0 for all l1 ∈
EU1 ∩Ec and l2 ∈ EU2 ∩Ec. Suppose that e ∈ SU1 . By (28b),
D˜T,e = RU1D˜U1,e + RU2D˜U2,e if D˜Vi,l < 0 ∀l ∈ Ec,i, and
D˜T,e = −RU1D˜U1,e − RU2D˜U2,e if D˜Vi,l > 0 ∀l ∈ Ec,i. If
6See (25) for the definitions of notations.
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RU1 ≤ RU2 , we will have D˜T,e ≥ 0 since D˜U1,e = −D˜U2,e,
which contradicts with e ∈ ST . Thus, RU1 > RU2 , and hence
|D˜T,e| = (RU1 −RU2) · |D˜U1,e|
≤ RU1 |D˜U1,e| < RU1fU1,1, (32)
where the last inequality holds for the same reason as (31).
Then, it suffices to prove that maxU∈T {RUfU,1} ≤ fT,1. To
see this, note that ∀U ∈ T,RUfU,1 = maxU ′∈T fU ′,1. Thus,
fT,1 = min
l∈Ec
∑
U∈T
IEU (l)RU |D˜U,l| ≥ min
l∈Ec
∑
U∈T
IEU (l)RUfU,1
= min
l∈Ec
∑
U∈T
IEU (l) max
U ′∈T
fU ′,1 ≥ max
U ′∈T
fU ′,1. (33)
Combined with (31) and (32), this leads to |D˜T,e| < fT,1 for
any e ∈ ST . Therefore, we have fT,0 < fT,1.
Finally, due to assumption 3) of this corollary, we have
fU,g = 0,∀U ∈ T , which leads to fT,g = 0. Thus, due to
fT,1 > fT,0, (29) holds for all e ∈ Ec and (30) holds for all
e′ ∈ EH \Ec, which proves the corollary by Theorem V.3.
Example 3. We take the system shown in Fig. 2 as an
example, where we assume all the nodes in H to be load buses.
The failure of {l2, l6} partitions H into three islands, where
V1 = {u8}, V2 = {u1, u2, u3, u6, u7}, and V3 = {u4, u5}. We
provide several ways of constructing L and T .
If we have ∆∗u1 = ∆
∗
u2 = 0 (satisfying condition 3 in Corol-
lary V.2 for H2), and |D˜u2,l1 | < |D˜u2,l2 |, |D˜u2,l3 | < |D˜u2,l2 |,
|D˜u1,l5 | < |D˜u1,l6 | (satisfying condition 2 in Corollary V.2 for
H2), then we can construct L = {H2} that satisfies all the
conditions in Corollary V.2. Accordingly, T = {{u1}, {u2}}
satisfies all the conditions in Theorem V.3. Thus, Fˆ = Ec.
Alternatively, if p′u4 = p
′
u8 = 0 (satisfying condition 3 in
Corollary V.2 for H1 and H3), we can construct L = {H1, H3}
and T = {{u4}, {u8}}, where ST = ∅ and fT,g = −p′u4 −
p′u8 = 0. Then, it is easy to check that all the conditions of
Corollary V.2 and Theorem V.3 are satisfied, which guarantees
Fˆ = Ec.
Remark: Corollary V.2 extends Theorem V.1 in [1], in the
sense that Corollary V.2 only requires hypothetical power flows
on failed links to be in the same direction, while Theorem V.1
of [1] requires these power flows to have specific directions.
Specifically, if all the nodes in VL,c are load buses and D˜u,e >
0,∀u ∈ VL,c, e ∈ Ec, then condition 3) of Corollary V.2
requires p′u = 0,∀u ∈ VL,c, which is exactly the same as
the conditions of Theorem V.1 in [1]. However, Corollary V.2
can additionally cover the cases that D˜u,e < 0 and ∆∗u = 0,
∀u ∈ VL,c, e ∈ Ec.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We test our solutions on the Polish power grid (“Polish
system - winter 1999-2000 peak”) [26] with 2383 nodes and
2886 links, where parallel links are combined into one link.
We generate the attacked area H by randomly choosing one
node as a starting point and performing a breadth first search
to obtain H with a predetermined |VH |. We then randomly
choose |F | links within H to fail. The phase angles of each
island without any generator or load are set to 0, and the
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Figure 5. Prob. of correctly identifying failed link status with known phase
angles but unknown active powers (|VH | = 40).
rest are computed according to (1). We vary |VH | and |F | to
explore different settings, and for each setting, we generate 70
different H’s and 300 different F ’s per H .
We evaluate two types of metrics: (1) how often the recovery
conditions are satisfied, and (2) how accurate our algorithm
is when its recovery conditions are not necessarily satisfied.
A. Probability of Guaranteed Recovery
First, we evaluate the fraction of randomly generated cases
(combinations of H and F ) satisfying the conditions in
Theorem III.1 for recovering the phase angles, and The-
orem IV.1.(1)7 for localizing the failed links with known
phase angles and active powers. We observe that: (i) the
condition in Theorem III.1 is almost never satisfied under a
nontrivial size of H (|VH | = 20, . . . , 40), which emphasizes the
importance of securing PMU measurements; (ii) the condition
in Theorem IV.1.(1) is only satisfied with a small probability
as shown Fig. 4, which decreases with the size of H (note that
Theorem IV.1.(1) does not depend on F ). In previous work [3],
this issue was addressed by actively designing “zones” for
reporting measurements such that each zone satisfies these strin-
gent conditions, which only works for attacks limited to single
zones. In contrast, our recovery conditions are much more
general as shown below (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6), even though we
do not assume to know the post-attack power injections in H .
Then, we evaluate the fraction of links satisfying the recovery
conditions in Lemma V.2 and Theorems V.1–V.3, together with
the actual fraction of links whose status are correctly identified
by Algorithm 1, under known phase angles and unknown
active powers. The results are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6,
where “Experimental Results” is the actual performance of
Algorithm 1, “Lemma V.2” indicates the failed/operational
links satisfying Lemma V.2, and “Theorems V.1–V.3” indicates
the failed links that satisfy either Theorem V.1 or (29) in
7We only tested condition (1) in Theorem IV.1, as the other condition relies
on complicated graph properties that are difficult to test.
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Figure 6. Prob. of correctly identifying operational link status with known
phase angles but unknown active powers (|VH | = 40).
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Figure 7. Prob. that conditions of Theorems V.1–V.3 hold.
Theorem V.3, or the operational links that satisfy either
Theorem V.2 or (30) in Theorem V.3. More specifically, Figs. 5–
6 (a) shows the fraction of correctly identified failed/operational
links, averaged over all the randomly generated cases, where
the bottom and the top edges of the error bar indicate the
25th and 75th percentiles. In addition, Figs. 5–6 (b) shows the
fraction of cases with no miss/false alarm.
It is worth noting that checking whether Theorems V.1–V.3
hold for each link is hard since it requires testing all possible
hyper-nodes, whose number is exponential in |VH |. To test
whether Theorem V.1 holds for a given link, we heuristically
construct a hyper-node through BFS starting from each of its
endpoints. In each iteration of BFS, we add all the nodes that
cause violation of condition 1 or condition 2 in Theorem V.1
into the hyper-node and test whether condition 3 holds. This
procedure applies similarly to the testing of Theorem V.2 and
the construction of T in Theorem V.3. Likewise, checking
whether Lemma V.2 holds for each link is hard since it
requires testing all possible Qm and Qf . To test whether
a failed link e ∈ F satisfies Lemma V.2, we construct W
according to Qm = {e}, Qf = ∅ and test if (22) has a
non-negative solution. This procedure can be applied similarly
to an operational link l ∈ EH \ F . Therefore, the fractions of
links/cases covered by these theoretical conditions in Figs. 5–6
are bounds (upper-bound for Lemma V.2 and lower-bound for
Theorems V.1–V.3). Nevertheless, we see that (i) Theorems V.1-
V.3 explain the success of Algorithm 1 quite well, especially
when |F | is small, (ii) the theorems can explain most cases
covered by Lemma V.2, and (iii) Algorithm 1 is actually
highly accurate in identifying the operational links even
though the theoretical conditions for doing so appear stringent.
To better understand the relationship between Theorems V.1–
V.3, we decompose all the failed links into 4 categories: (1)
links satisfying both Theorem V.1 and (29) in Theorem V.3, (2)
links satisfying only (29) in Theorem V.3, (3) links satisfying
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Figure 8. Prob. that setting ∆ = 0 is feasible (|VH | = 40).
only Theorem V.1, and (4) links satisfying neither. Fig. 7 (a)
shows the fraction of links in each category, averaged over
all the simulated cases, where the bottom and the top edges
of the error bar indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles. We
observe that (i) many failed links satisfy both conditions; (ii)
with growing |F |, the fraction of failed links satisfying only
(29) in Theorem V.3 decreases, while the fraction of links
satisfying only Theorem V.1 increases; (iii) the fraction of
links covered by neither of the conditions remains small as |F |
grows. Similarly, we look into the coverage of Theorem V.2
and (30) in Theorem V.3 for operational links, as shown in
Fig. 7 (b). Similar phenomena are observed, except that the
fraction of links covered by neither of these conditions increases
with growing |F |, which is consistent with Fig. 6.
B. Accuracy of Failure Localization
Next, we focus on the accuracy of Algorithm 1 in comparison
with benchmarks in localizing the failed links, assuming
that post-attack phase angles are known. This assumption
is justified by the better protection of PMU measurements
from cyber attacks [21]. We consider two benchmarks: (i)
the solution given in Theorem IV.1 (extended from [3]), i.e.,
estimating F by supp(x) for the solution to min ‖x‖1 s.t. (10),
assuming the true ∆H to be known, and (ii) min ‖x‖1 s.t.
‖BH|G(θ − θ′)−DHx‖2 ≤ ‖pH‖2, which is extended from
the solutions in [15], [16]. We note that the original solution in
[3] (which assumes ∆ = 0) is often infeasible for our problem,
as shown in Fig. 8, and thus not used as a benchmark. Note that
benchmark (i) is meant to be a “performance upper bound”,
as it assumes more knowledge (i.e., ground-truth ∆H ) than
our proposed algorithm.
As shown in Fig. 9, benchmark (i) demonstrates the best
performance with regard to both miss-detection rate and the
probability of having no miss-detection, while Algorithm 1
performs much better than benchmark (ii). This confirms the
importance of knowing or estimating load shedding values
in failure localization. Regarding the false alarm as shown in
Fig. 10, Algorithm 1 performs even better than benchmark (i).
This is because the decision variable x in benchmark (i)
combines the information of both the failed links and the phase
angles θ′H , and thus does not fully exploit the knowledge of θ
′
H .
Furthermore, from the specific number of false alarms/misses in
Fig. 11, we see that Algorithm 1 correctly detects all the failed
links with almost no false alarm majority of the time, while
only missing a couple of failed links for the rest of the time.
Summary: The above results imply that while it is difficult to
recover the phase angles from inference, if we can protect phase
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Figure 9. Performance comparison on miss rate (|VH | = 40).
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Figure 10. Performance comparison on false alarm rate (|VH | = 40).
angle measurements from the cyber attack, then our algorithm
can be used to infer the link status in the attacked area with high
accuracy, even under unknown changes in power injections.
VII. CONCLUSION
We investigated the problem of power grid state estimation
under general cyber-physical attack that may disconnect the
grid. First, we demonstrated that existing solutions and the
corresponding recovery conditions for recovering phase angles
and link status are still applicable with the knowledge of
post-attack power injections. Second, for unknown post-attack
power injections, we proposed an LP-based algorithm to
identify link status within the attacked area with knowledge of
recovered phase angles. We established sufficient conditions
for the proposed algorithm to identify the link status correctly.
Finally, our evaluations based on the Polish power grid
demonstrated that the proposed algorithm is highly accurate
in localizing the failed links, and the majority of cases
are theoretically guaranteed by the presented conditions.
Meanwhile, the existing condition for perfect phase angle
recovery is hard to satisfy in practice, indicating the importance
of safeguarding PMU measurements from cyber attack.
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Figure 11. Number of false alarms/misses of Algorithm 1 (|VH | = 40).
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